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Abstract
This paper studies the inﬂuencing factors on entry (certiﬁcation) of new airlines into the US airline in-
dustry over 21 years (1979–1999). These rates exhibit considerable ﬂuctuations over the observed period.
We analyze the US airline industry for a period of 21 years to determine the relationship of the observed
ﬂuctuations in the entry rates with political and extraordinary events, economic conditions and several
industry speciﬁc variables. We present maximum likelihood estimates of an entry model on the negative
Binomial distribution. This methodology reﬂects the discrete nature of the dependent variable. The results
support the notions of positive macro-economic and industry speciﬁc developments on the entry oppor-
tunities of new airline companies.  2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Market entry; Deregulation; Industry ecology; Political signaling
1. Introduction
Research on entry in deregulated air transportation markets has been divided into two main
streams. The ﬁrst group studies the entry of new entrant carriers into new routes and hubs
(Hendricks et al., 1997; Windle and Dresner, 1995; Whinston and Collins, 1992; Hurdle et al.,
1989), while the other group focuses on survival of post entry carriers (Levine, 1987; Gudm-
undsson, 1998, 1999). However, relatively little research eﬀort has dealt with entry of new airlines
into the industry (see Dresner and Windle (1999)), i.e. what are the determinants of successful
certiﬁcation and start of operations by new airlines. For this kind of research an a priori
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assumption is that entry rate of new carriers is a determining factor of competition intensity and
dynamics in the industry. The formation of new airline companies and the process towards an
operating ﬁtness certiﬁcate issued by the US department of transportation (DOT) is associated
with a number of barriers and inﬂuences. Such barriers to certiﬁcation are likely to be ﬁnancial,
equipment availability (aircraft), cost of capital, anticipated competition, government and regu-
latory policy and extraordinary events.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relative importance of economic conditions,
political and regulatory environment, and competition on the number of entrants in the US airline
industry. Section 2 presents a summary overview of the entry procedure for the airline market in
the US. In the following section we will discuss each source of barriers speciﬁcally and deﬁne the
hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data and the variables. Section 5 discusses the study meth-
odology including model and estimation techniques. Section 6 presents the empirical results and
Section 7 contains the conclusions.
2. US airline market
A new airline applying for operating certiﬁcate from the DOT must prove ﬁnancial ﬁtness.
From 1990 through July 1995 the DOT ﬁled 180 applications for all operating categories (jet and
prop) of which 50% completed the process successfully. Of these 90, 57 were operating in July
1995, while 33 began operations but folded operations within the period. Furthermore, 33 ap-
plicants were found ﬁt but never commenced operations, while 47 did not complete the process,
were dismissed or denied certiﬁcate. For proposed jet operations the numbers are diﬀerent as 41
carriers were found ﬁt in the period January 1990 to December 1995, and of these 41, 30 com-
menced operations (GAO, 1996). Looking at the period 1979–1999 for jet operating carriers (see
Table 1), we see that 176 received operating certiﬁcate, 123 (70%) started operations and 37 (21%)
certiﬁcates are still in eﬀect. 2
2.1. Certiﬁcation process
New airlines need two separate authorizations from the DOT before commencing operations.
One is the economic authority from the Oﬃce of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) and the
other is the safety authority for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The OST is con-
cerned with the applicant’s management competence, ability to comply with regulation and
ﬁnancial resources to operate the airline. The FAA ﬂight standards service (FSS) determines
whether the applicant’s personnel, facilities, aircraft and manuals meet federal safety standards.
The process is dual as demonstrated in Fig. 1, meaning that an applicant can meet one agency
requirement but fail in another process.
GAO (1996) reported that the primary cause of applicants, found ﬁt in the OST process, but
failing to begin operations was lack of ﬁnancial resources. Yet the OST had found these appli-
2 This number includes charter and cargo operators.
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cants ﬁnancially ﬁt before they had suﬃcient funds to complete both certiﬁcation processes
(GAO, 1996, p. 6). Thus, the FAA and DOT have tried to harmonize the process so that
Fig. 1. New airline certiﬁcation process.
Table 1
Entry Statistics in the US airlines industry 1979–1999
Year Total jet ﬁtness
certiﬁcate issued
Commenced
operations
Proportion commencing
operations
Existing certiﬁcates
in 1999
1979 18 15 0.83 2
1980 11 6 0.55 1
1981 19 13 0.68 4
1982 16 10 0.63 1
1983 17 12 0.71 4
1984 23 17 0.74 3
1985 8 4 0.50 0
1986 5 3 0.60 0
1987 3 3 1.0 1
1988 2 2 1.0 2
1989 7 6 0.86 2
1990 1 1 1.0 0
1991 2 2 1.0 1
1992 7 6 0.86 2
1993 8 6 0.75 5
1994 12 8 0.67 4
1995 3 3 1.0 0
1996 6 3 0.50 2
1997 4 1 0.25 1
1998 1 1 1.0 1
1999 3 1 0.33 1
Total 176 123 0.70 37
Source: DOT, 2000. Note that the issuance of a ﬁtness certiﬁcate can involve existing carriers changing operating status.
The status of few airlines 1997, 1998 and 1999 was uncertain at the issuance of the data in 2000, there may be some
discrepancies for these three years.
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applicants must complete certain steps, called gates, in both processes before being allowed to
continue the certiﬁcation process. After the FAA certiﬁcation process is successfully completed
the OST requires the applicant to verify that suﬃcient funds have been raised for beginning
and sustaining operations. One of the reasons for this approach is that most applicants are un-
able to raise capital unless the OST has found them ﬁnancially ﬁt, as ﬁnancial institutions will
require such assurance. Yet the approval of the OST is no guarantee that suﬃcient funds will
become available. The FAA as reported by GAO will as a consequence spend internal funds to
process the application and in many cases ﬁnd the applicant ﬁt, although the applicant will
eventually not meet the OST ﬁnancial criteria. As a consequence the OST raised the standards by
requiring third-party veriﬁcation and copies of funding instruments before the applicant is found
ﬁt.
3. Barriers to certiﬁcation and hypotheses
3.1. Financial and equipment barriers to certiﬁcation
In our analysis we segregate ﬁnancial barriers into two categories labor costs and access to
capital, represented as cost of capital. The equipment barrier deals with the level of aircraft
availability. Most new airlines keep entry costs at minimum by utilizing eﬃciently the retired
aircrafts from the larger airline companies. 3 Dresner and Windle (1999) examined the inﬂuence of
two factors on nonincumbent entry rates on individual routes. The factors were labor costs and
aircraft availability. Labor costs are assumed to be related to the supply of labor and the same
applies to aircraft, the higher the supply the lower the acquisition cost or lease rates. 4 The greater
the emphasis on cost savings in the industry, associated with industry down cycles, the more likely
it is that new entrants have access to cheap but proﬁcient labor. In addition, during such period it
is also likely that existing airlines retire aircraft equipment due to consolidation in the route
network and ineﬃciencies of older aircraft. Yet, these production factors did not show a clear
relationship 5 with entry rates as expected in a study by Dresner and Windle. 6 Based on their
results we decided in our research not to include these two factors but explore other potential
factors. We selected interest rates to represent cost of capital as a proxy for ﬁnancial barrier to
entry. High capital requirements can discourage potential entrants. In particular, when the po-
tential entrants have to borrow loans at a high interest rate. Thus,
3 Most common aircraft types used in the past have been Boeing 737, 727 and Douglas DC9.
4 The majority of new airlines lease aircraft rather than buy, because of inability to fund acquisition, conservation of
capital, reduce ﬁnancial risk, increase ﬂexibility and facilitate upgrading of aircraft later.
5 One of the reasons why a large increase in the supply of used aircraft does not necessarily lead to indiscriminately
better access is that leasing companies need to be assured that the lessee is capable of keeping up the payments as the
lessor still has to pay to the ﬁnanciers (usually banks) if the lessee fails to maintain payments. Furthermore, the costs of
repossessing the aircraft can be substantial on top of lost lease payments, accrued maintenance expense and
depreciation expenses.
6 They reported a slight correlation, but insuﬃcient to demonstrate a clear relationship.
208 S.V. Gudmundsson, H.L. van Kranenburg / Transportation Research Part E 38 (2002) 205–219
Hypothesis 1. A decrease in interest rate will have a positive impact on entry of new carriers.
Another important barrier is the share of investment that must be committed by the entrant.
Commitment costs enhance the entrant’s vulnerability to retaliatory responses by the incumbents.
These costs diminish the rate at which entry responds to positive incumbent proﬁts (Caves and
Porter, 1977). However, the share of long-run outlays in total costs is likely to be low in those
industries that are using capital that can be easily leased or for which an active second-hand
market exists (Kessides, 1990). A high proportion of commitment investment in the entry costs
impedes the establishment of new airlines. Thus, it is expected that there exists an inverse rela-
tionship between the aircraft equipment barrier and the entry rates of new airlines. This leads to
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. A decrease in aircraft cost as percentage of total expenditure will have a positive
impact on entry of new carriers.
3.2. Demand
Several studies suggest that industries enjoying favorable economic conditions––such as de-
mand growth––are, in general, more attractive to potential entrants (see, e.g. Geroski (1995) and
Baldwin (1998)). It is expected that the ability of the airline industry to remain attractive for
potential entrants is dependent on the growth of the economy. Since the huge initial investments
are undertaken on the basis of a given market size, which at that point in time is considered as
suﬃciently attractive for new airline companies to enter the industry. The higher the rate of
growth of the economy, ceteris paribus, the less an entrant’s action will depress the industry proﬁt.
The rate of growth of gross domestic product (GDP) may be a useful measure of the incentive to
enter. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. The probability that a new airline company will enter is positively related to eco-
nomic growth in the country.
3.3. Political and regulatory environment and extraordinary events
Since deregulation of the US air transportation industry in 1978 we can state that a discon-
tinues change occurred in the political environment of airlines. Yet, the impact of political en-
vironments on organization populations has not been researched to any large degree. Carroll et al.
(1988) demonstrated that under regulation organizations are often accountable to fewer regula-
tory agencies, while deregulation has a decentralization eﬀect rather than a reduction in regulation
per se. The argument is highly appropriate although one must assume that deregulation is con-
cerned with the economic aspects and thus truly a reduction of constraints within that speciﬁc
area of running airlines. However, deregulation has demonstrated that regulation dealing with
safety and competition enhancing aspects of the operating environment, such as, anti-trust, access
and entry, have taken on a greater role.
The start of deregulation was an important political event marked by the pro-consumer
Carter Administration. The second important event was the transfer of power to the Reagan
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Administration, which was characterized by laissez faire policy. The Bush Administration con-
tinued the policy in regard to the airlines.
Governments enter oﬃce with various pledges to voters and are expected to funnel their policy
throughout the various agencies that inﬂuence these pledges, thus, constituting an agency prob-
lem. If there is a narrow gap between the politicians and the agency the eﬃciency of the repre-
sentation is enhanced in terms of realizing political pledges to the constituents (see Campbell and
Lopez (1998)). We deﬁne this activity as political signaling or in other words the attempt to in-
ﬂuence agencies to adopt certain political directions in internal policy. It is important to note that
due to an agency problem such inﬂuence may be subtle rather than direct. Thus, signaling can be
in the form of who is nominated to head a speciﬁc agency, investigations undertaken, speeches
and news articles both external and internal to the agency. We assume that strong political sig-
naling will facilitate agency actions in accordance with the principal’s intentions, given that these
do not violate underlying principles of the agency’s operation, such as ethics and safety. Assuming
that governments act in a rational way, signaling will be strong if the issue at hand is considered to
inﬂuence voters positively, but agency signaling will neutralize if an extraordinary event impacts
the issue in a negative way, i.e. if voting signal is altered due to a change in public opinion.
In 1993 the Clinton Administration came into power with a strong pro-entry policy (Moorman,
1993) and nominated a strong advocate of that policy to the position of Transportation Secretary.
This government sent strong political signals that consumers should beneﬁt from low-cost air
travel (DOT, 1996) and therefore low-cost entry should be stimulated in air transportation
markets. However, in late 1995 and mid 1996 there were two events that had impact on the US
airline industry. The ﬁrst event was the change in the DOT ﬁtness procedures, marked by more
stringent measures to prove ﬁnancial ﬁtness as already discussed. The apparent drive for these
changes was eﬃciency, i.e. expenditure per application was considered high in view of many
applicants entering the latter parts of the procedure, but then being unable to ﬁnd the necessary
ﬁnancial resources to start operations (GAO, 1996). Shortly after the change in the ﬁtness pro-
cedures, the second extraordinary event occurred when Valujet, a low-cost new-entry success
story, had a tragic plane crash in Florida. The immediate assumption in the media was that low-
cost new entrant airlines were cutting corners on safety to keep costs down. A relatively hom-
ogenous coverage along these lines caused the Federal Government to distance itself from agency
signaling concerning the beneﬁts of low-cost new-entry due to strong public signaling marked by
the avoidance of such carriers. The agency signal was neutralized marked by the resignation of the
incumbent Transportation Secretary an advocate of the policy. Thus, we hypothesize that the
scrutiny of operating ﬁtness applications by the agent was increased in the name of public good,
i.e. public safety (see GAO (1996)). Also, one must assume that applicants for a ﬁtness certiﬁcate
faced a raised barrier to new airline capitalization. Given these events in the airline industry we
deﬁne two related hypotheses with respect to entry of new airlines.
Hypothesis 4a. Favorable political climate ratiﬁed through pro-entry political signaling will have
a positive impact on the number of operating ﬁtness certiﬁcates issued (by DOT).
Hypothesis 4b. Although a change in the certiﬁcation process and an extraordinary event such as
the accident will have a negative impact on the number of operating ﬁtness certiﬁcates issued, the
favorable conditions in the airline industry still dominate this event and change (by DOT).
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3.4. Competition
A common a priori assumption is that a rational entrant will base his decision to enter an
industry on anticipated post-entry proﬁts. Supporting that notion, Hannan and Carroll (1992)
found that the entry level is inversely proportional to the level of competition in an industry. 7
Therefore, their ﬁndings support the assumption that the expected competitors’ reactions to entry
inﬂuence the choice of potential entrants whether or not to enter a market. Incumbent ﬁrms may
follow a strategy of predatory pricing, setting the price at such a (low) level that new entrants’
proﬁt opportunities reduce to zero. However, predation does not necessarily have to occur in
highly competitive markets if threat by reputation or other reaction signals exists. Southwest
Airlines, for example, has kept to its policy of avoiding incumbents’ strong holds throughout its
history, even after it entered the ranks of a major carrier, thus not testing the incumbents’ ability
to exercise competitive force, whether predatory or not. Yet, the underlying economic theory of
deregulation ‘contestability’ has been found not to apply in air transportation markets (Levine,
1987; Whinston and Collins, 1992).
The intensity of competition is likely to be inﬂuenced by the anticipated response of incumbents
on entry. Incumbent ﬁrms can use strategic and tactical actions to deter entry or to protect their
market share (see, e.g. Bain (1956), Sutton (1991) and Thomas (1999)). One of the more important
determinants of competition is advertising. Advertising matters to airlines because it is a way of
attracting customers and to deter potential entrants in a particular niche (Beven, 1974; Schma-
lensee, 1978; Yip, 1982). Levine (1987) 8 also suggested that the higher the entry rate the stronger
the reaction by incumbents through advertising expenditure. Thus, the incumbent ﬁrms use ad-
vertising as a way to build consumer loyalty in order to deter entry (e.g. Bunch and Smiley
(1992)). However, the role of advertising has been a subject of ongoing controversy in the in-
dustrial organization literature. Another group points out that advertising increases the size of the
market and does not result in market share losses. In other words, more advertisements and
promotion in the airline industry stimulate potential airline companies to enter the market.
Consequently, advertising as information perspective makes the markets more competitive and
drives down proﬁt rates eventually (e.g. Roberts and Samuelson (1988), Greuer et al., 2000 and
Scott Morton, 2000).
In this study, we assume that competition intensity is working as a deterrent to entry. We
hypothesize that the higher the proportional expenditure on advertisements and promotion from
one year to another, the more intense the competition environment is, and the lower the entry rate
(e.g. Bain (1956), Orr (1974), Deutsch (1984) and Baldwin, 1998). Thus,
Hypothesis 5. Competition intensity (measured through proportional advertising expenditure)
will negatively aﬀect the number of new airlines in the air transportation industry.
7 They also show an inverse relationship with entry rates and industry concentration.
8 See pages 425–432. (See also: Airline Advertising Reform Act of 1991 (H.R. 5124), House of Representatives, 102
Congress, 2nd Session. September 24, 1992. US Government Printing Oﬃce, Washington, 1993.)
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4. The data
In order to test the hypotheses that we have developed so far, we constructed a data set on the
US airline industry composed of data from various sources. The primary sources we employ were
from the DOT, Air Transport Association and US Census Bureau. The ﬁrst source provided
information regarding the number of entrants, while the second one provided data about airline
cost factors. The Statistical Abstract indicators database of the United States of the US Census
Bureau provided an extensive collection of data about social, economic and political indicators.
For the information on political and regulatory environment and extraordinary events we also
consulted newspapers and specialized journals which reported on the events.
The dependent variable in our research is the annual total number of jet ﬁtness certiﬁcates
issued in the US. For this study we also apply a number of explanatory variables that could
inﬂuence the number of certiﬁcates issued. The cost of capital has a direct impact on production,
competition and the structure of the market. In general, high capital requirements can discourage
potential entrants. The ﬁrst variable is related to the cost of borrowing a loan. We include the
average book interest rate in percentage, interest rate, as an indicator of capital barrier. To esti-
mate the relationship of the equipment barrier to entry of new airlines, we used average aircraft
costs 9 as percentage of total expenditure (major and national airlines), aircraft costs. This vari-
able reﬂects the proportional cost of leasing and/or purchasing costs of aircraft in use by US
airlines.
Rapid growth in demand creates opportunities for ﬁrms to enter irrespective of the size of the
entry barrier. In previous studies it is shown that a growing economy will stimulate the demand of
the number of ﬂights. This development creates opportunities for potential airline companies to
enter the market. Hence, we argue that entry should be positively related to the demand growth.
The relative change in the real US GDP, growth GDP, is used as a measure of the industry de-
mand growth.
A measure of average annual advertising and promotion expenditure per ton-miles by the in-
cumbents in dollar cents, advertising costs, is used as a proxy to represent competition intensity in
our study. We examined the relationship between Herﬁndahl–Hirshman Index 10 (HHI) a well
known measurement for industry concentration and the proportional advertising expenditure. We
found a negative correlation (0.21), indicating that as airline industry concentration goes down
advertising expenditure goes up. The advertising and promotion costs are conversed in a log
variable, because we are interested in the relationship between the entry of new airlines and the
advertisement and promotion costs in percentage.
Government policy and extraordinary events for the US airline industry are indicated by two
dummy variables in our model. The involved events are deregulation by the Carter administra-
tion, the laissez faire policy of the Reagan administration, the Clinton’s pro-entry policy, the FAA
revision of certiﬁcation process and the Valujet crash. It is likely that the last two events had a
negative impact on the number of entrants, while the others stimulated entry. To control for these
diﬀerent impacts, two dummy variables, extraordinary and political events, are included which
9 Includes lease, aircraft and engine rentals, depreciation and amortization (passenger airlines only).
10 HHI < 1001 ¼ low, 1001–1800 ¼ medium, >1800 ¼ high concentration.
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take the value of one if one of these events occurred in the previous year. The dummy variables
measure the direct eﬀect of an event on the number of new airlines in the following year. Since we
are interested in the indicative impact of an event we believe that such impact is captured in the
model eﬀectively through change in entry in the year following an event.
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows the DOT certiﬁcation statistics for jet operating airlines from 1979 to 1999. The
data demonstrates two peaks of ﬁtness certiﬁcates issued after a rather even period from 1979
(18), peaking in 1984 (23) and a second shorter period from 1992 (7), peaking in 1994 (12). New jet
operating airlines actually commencing operations was used in our analysis to capture any bar-
riers that might aﬀect the applicants in the process, including any barrier internal to the process
itself such a stricter requirements or external to the process such as capital access. New airlines
actually commencing operations show similar trends as in DOT certiﬁcates issued, with a peak
in 1984 (17) and a second peak in 1994 (8). Of the total number of new airlines commencing
operations from 1979 to 1999 only 30% had operating certiﬁcates in eﬀect in 1999.
Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2 and explanatory variable cor-
relations in Table 3. The mean of number of certiﬁcates issued in the US airline industry was 5.8
but the standard deviation is high (5.0), with values ranging from 1 to 17 (for 1984). Five historical
events (24% of the sample time-series) were classiﬁed as inﬂuential governmental actions and
extraordinary events on the dynamics of the US airline industry. Mean interest rate for the period
1978–1998 is 9.3. This reported mean is high because the minimum interest in the investigation
period was 7.1%. The average annual interest rate was above 10% at the beginning of the eighties.
The ratio of aircraft costs relative to total expenditure of an airline was, on average 7.6%. The
growth of the GDP in the United States was on average 3.0%, but the standard deviation is
relatively high (2%), with growth rate values ﬂuctuating between a decline of 2% and an increase
of 7%. The reported mean of the advertising and promotion costs per revenue ton-miles was, on
average, 2.0 dollar cents. The development of this particular component of costs for US airlines
shows an u-shaped curve.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics (21 year)
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Entry Total no. jet carriers ﬁt and
operating
5.8 5.0 1 17
Political events (þ) Pro-entry events 0.14 0.36 0 1
Extraordinary events () Negative events 0.01 0.30 0 1
Interest rate Average annual book interest
rate in percentage
9.3 1.1 7.1 11.2
Aircraft costs Aircraft costs as percentage of
total expenditure
7.6 1.6 5.2 9.7
Growth GDP Annual growth rate of GDP 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07
Advertising costs Advertising and promotion costs
per revenue ton-miles in cents
2.0 0.5 1.2 2.5
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5. Methods and speciﬁcation of analysis
5.1. The method
Since the aim of this research is to investigate the relative importance of various determinants of
entry rate in the US airline industry, it is appropriate to use a longitudinal research design. The
particular design chosen was a study from 1978 until 1999. The number of entrants in this study is
deﬁned as the total number of entry ﬁtness certiﬁcates issued in a given year that lead to actual
entry. 11 Because the number of new airline entrants data are count data (nonnegative integer
valued random-data) and deviate from classical regression assumptions, the statistical speciﬁca-
tion of entry calls for a discrete-probability distribution. In order to meet this requirement, an
econometric model of number of entrants is used that is based on both the Poisson and negative
Binomial distributions. This methodology is in the spirit of Hausman et al. (1984), Cameron and
Trivedi (1986) and Davutyan (1989), who apply the discrete-probability models to count data on
patent applications across ﬁrms, consumer demand for health care services, and bank failures re-
spectively.
The discrete probability approach admits a richer analysis of the number of entrants than the
classical regression models based on the principle of ordinary least squares method of model
estimation. First, the classical linear (OLS) models can provide an incomplete description of the
entry data. The logarithm transformation of entry is only well deﬁned for positive entry rates, and
undeﬁned when entry is absent. Second, a discrete variable with strictly nonnegative values cannot
be normally distributed. These problems are overcome by the Poisson approach. With the dis-
tribution of the number of entrants speciﬁed as Poisson, we are able to estimate the probability of
the entry rate and the relationship with the intentions of the US government, and other industry
and macro-economic developments.
Table 3
Variable correlations (Pearson) of explanatory variables
N ¼ 21 Political
events
Extraordinary
events
Interest
rate
Aircraft
cost
Growth
GDP
Advertising
cost
Political events (þ) 1.000
Extraordinary events () 0.132 1.000
Interest rate 0.131 0.039 1.000
Aircraft costs 0.181 0.439 0.404 1.000
Growth GDP 0.232 0.162 0.090 0.260 1.000
Advertising costs 0.238 0.349 0.768 0.276 0.026 1.000
 Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
 Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
11 A proportion of airlines receiving OST and FAA operating certiﬁcate are unable to demonstrate capital in
accordance with ﬁnancial plan and do therefore not commence operations.
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The number of new airline entrants data are assumed to be generated by the following Poisson
distribution:
PrðEiÞ ¼ ðexpðkiÞkEii Þ=Ei ð1Þ
The mean and the variance of Ei, the number of entrants, are equal to ki with speciﬁcation
ki ¼ E½EijXi	 ¼ gðXi;bÞ ¼ expðXibÞ. Hence, the explanatory variables, Xi enter the model by
specifying the Poisson parameter ki as a function of Xi and an unknown parameter, b, to be es-
timated.
However, many entry data have a variance exceeding the means and are thus overdispersed
relative to the Poisson rate. The negative Binomial model provides a mechanism for incorporating
overdispersion in the count model (Grouieroux et al., 1984a, 1984b; Hausman et al., 1984 and
Cameron and Trivedi, 1986). This generalized model encompasses the Poisson distribution and
allows the variance of the process to diﬀer from the mean. The Poisson model makes no allowance
for an error term, while the negative Binomial model allows for the incorporation of an additional
parameter, the dispersion parameter, which can act as an error term. This means that if one or
more important explanatory variable is not included, the dispersion parameter provides a mech-
anism for incorporating unobserved variables into the analysis (Greene, 1997).
The validity of the variance–mean equation can be tested with the classical standard methods
such as the likelihood ratio test and the Wald test. More optimal tests are the regression based
ones that test the assumption of variance–mean equality, VARðEiÞ ¼ MeanðEiÞ as a null hy-
pothesis, against alternative hypothesis H1: VARðEiÞ ¼ MeanðEiÞ þ aðMeanðEiÞÞ2. If a ¼ 0, then
the mean–variance equality for the number of entrants data set cannot be rejected. Our statistical
benchmark model for the number of new airline entries in the US airline industry is thus the
Poisson model. We compare the estimates of both count data models to show the extent to which
the eﬀects of the explanatory variables on the number of new airline entries are robust and
whether the eﬀect of changes in speciﬁcations of the model makes a diﬀerence.
6. Empirical results
The results of the Poisson and the negative Binomial models explaining the number of issued
new airlines certiﬁcates are presented in Table 4. The leftmost model reports the results of a
Poisson analysis and the right model reports the results of a negative Binomial analysis of the
same data. Two likelihood ratio statistics are presented. The ﬁrst Chi-squared value shows the
signiﬁcant improvement of the Poisson model with explanatory variables upon the Poisson model
with a constant term only. In order to choose between the Poisson and negative Binomial model,
we tested the mean–variance equality hypothesis. Table 5 shows the result of the regression-based
test for overdispersion of Poisson model. The test shows no clear evidence of overdispersion in the
data, since a is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the regression-based test. This is also con-
ﬁrmed by the additional overdispersion parameter in the negative Binomial model to allow for
overdispersion beyond the eﬀects of explanatory variables. The corresponding Chi-squared value
(0.50) diﬀers insigniﬁcantly from zero.
As hypothesized, the coeﬃcient of political events has the expected positive sign and is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. The pro-entry political signaling events are signiﬁcant, at p 0.00 and p 0.026
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respectively. A pro-entry action in a particular year stimulated the number of entrants in the
following year. There is evidence that government changed the opportunity for potential airlines
to enter successfully the market through intervention or announcements of potential actions. To
assess if there was a negative impact on entry into the industry attributable to the Valujet crash
and the change in the certiﬁcation process, we included the Extraordinary event period as a
separate variable. The extraordinary coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in both
models, p 0.43 and p 0.50 respectively. In other words, the Valujet crash and the change in the
certiﬁcation process (both happened at approximately the same time) had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
entry in the following year. These results suggest the overriding eﬀect of long-term favorable
conditions over negative events such as accidents, whose impact seem to have short-term impact
on voters- and therefore likewise impact on political signaling.
The cost of capital of airlines, measured by the average annual book interest rate (interest rate),
has the expected negative eﬀect on the number of entrants, however, it is statistically insigniﬁcant
from zero. We therefore ﬁnd no support for hypothesis one. Another indicator that high capital
requirements can discourage potential entrants is the explanatory variable aircraft cost. The esti-
mated coeﬃcient is negative and highly signiﬁcant. This result strongly supports hypothesis two.
The impact eﬀect that can be measured based on the coeﬃcient indicates that the eﬀect of an
Table 4
Results of the Poisson and negative Binomial models explaining the number of issued new airlines certiﬁcates
Variable Poisson model Negative Binomial model
Political events (þ) 0.95 (0.26) 0.95 (0.43)
Extraordinary events () 0.66 (0.82) 0.66 (0.96)
Interest rate 0.34 (0.28) 0.34 (0.33)
Aircraft costs 0.50 (0.12) 0.50 (0.16)
Growth GDP 15.21 (4.38) 15.21 (7.76)
Advertising costsa 1.40 (1.20) 1.40 (1.24)
Constant 6.87 (2.57) 6.87 (3.30)
Dispersion parameter 0.07 (0.12)
Loglikelihood 47.92 47.66
Chi-squared 57.77 0.50
Df 6 1
Standard errors in parentheses.
 Signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
 Signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
a The discrete count models are also estimated without the explanatory variable advertising costs (also in log). The
parameter estimates of the other variables and their signiﬁcance level did not diﬀer from the estimation results given in
the table.
Table 5
Test for overdispersion in Poisson model
Coeﬃcient a Standard error t-ratio
0.02 0.04 0.39
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increase is large. The elasticity of number of entrants with respect to aircraft cost is 3.80 in the
model. 12
Economic growth in the United States was expected to raise the probability of new entry into
the US airline industry. The estimated coeﬃcient for this variable is positive as expected and
statistically signiﬁcant. Hence, the growth in GDP as an indicator for increased demand (growth
GDP) has a positive eﬀect on the number of entrants. The magnitude of the eﬀect of growth in
GDP on number of entrants also is large with an elasticity of 0.46.
Our last hypothesis tested the relationship between advertising and promotion intensity and
entry. In our model the variable advertising costs was a proxy for competition intensity based on
the assumption that as advertising intensity increases it impedes new carriers to enter the industry.
We ﬁnd no conclusive evidence on the relationship between advertising and promotion expen-
diture and the number of entrants. We therefore cannot conﬁrm whether ﬂuctuations in adver-
tising and promotion, as proxy for competition intensity, is a post-entry phenomena or an
inﬂuencing factor on entry into the industry.
7. Conclusion
Political events such as a change in policy play a signiﬁcant role in entry rates of new airlines
into the industry. However, our study showed a nonsigniﬁcant relationship between extraordinary
events and entry rates.
Our ﬁndings show a highly signiﬁcant relationship between aircraft cost and entry rates. This
variable for acquisition costs [lease, depreciation and amortization] of aircraft for new entrants
is important in view of unclear relationship reported in previous research between availability of
used aircraft in the market and entry rates. Thus, supporting the notion that if this kind of cost of
capital is favorable, it will have positive impact on entry.
Favorable economic conditions in the US such as demand growth attract potential airlines to
enter the industry, because the entrant’s action not signiﬁcantly depresses the incumbents and
industry proﬁt. Our study demonstrated a highly signiﬁcant relationship between growth GDP
and entry.
Advertising cost as a proxy for competition intensity did not demonstrate synchronization with
entry rates. This ﬁnding did not provide new insights on the impact of advertisements and pro-
motions on the entry rates of an industry.
We have shown that even in deregulated markets political events can play a role in entry rates
to an industry. Yet it is not clear that a change in voting signals or popular opinion, whether
rational or not, can cause a swift change in a political signal. In our study it is not shown if this
kind of change had any marked impact on the entry rate. Furthermore, we identiﬁed that changes
in internal agency processes towards certiﬁcation probably have impact on the number of airlines
completing the process successfully. Although this relationship could not be fully tested in our
12 Calculated in the conditional mean (predicted value of entry with all explanatory variables taken in the sample
mean) of 3.80. It should be noted that the skewed distribution of number of new issued entry certiﬁcates in the sample
results in a conditional mean below the sample mean of 5.8. The calculated elasticities are likely to diﬀer if evaluated at
other sample points.
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research, we deﬁned two negative events close in time, including the Valujet crash, as a separate
variable and did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant impact on entry rates.
However, it should be clear that due to the greatly reduced entry rates agency policy should be
to keep internal certiﬁcation barriers to a minimum by facilitating a process that is convenient to
the applicants, without jeopardizing public interest or safety. For further research, it is there-
fore recommended to investigate whether entry in deregulated markets has impact on market
structure, beneﬁting consumers to a much greater extent than the cost to the agency of processing
applications for operating certiﬁcates.
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